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Abstrnct
A two-country, intertemporal, perfect-foresight rnodel with micro
foundations, (loating exchange rates, uncovered interest parity, and
nominal wage rigiditiea ia formulated. 1'he benchmark case corre-
sponds to unít elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal subati-
tution in consumption, no initial holdings o( foreign asseta and infi-
nite lifetimes. Monctary disintlation and an increase in government
speudiug then have no spill-over e(fects on foreign consumption aud
employment and there is no current-account dynamics. Eour channela
of international policy transmission are tlten analysed. The first ia
based on capital gains on holdings o( foreign asaets. 'Che spill-over ef-
fccts arising thruugh the second aud third channel depend on whether
goods arc gross subatiWtes or gross completnents and on whethcr thc
elasl.icil.y of intertcmporal substitution is less or greater than one. 'Phe
final cbanncl a.avumes Íinite lifetimcs and no bequcst motive. It departe
from dcbt ncutrality in order to give a more interesting role to wealth
e(fe.cts and current-accouut dynamice and to avsess the difference be-
tween tax and debt fmance.
'This is a subatantially revised and extended version of van der Plceg (1989). [ am
grateful fon c~lpful discnssions wilh Anton Uarten,'fheo van de Klundert and Neil Rankin
and (or lhe incighl(ul and conslructive comments of an anonymous referee.Contents
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1 Introduction
The assumptions of risk-neutral arbitrage in e~cient ioreign exchange mar-
kets and infinitel,v flexible exchange rates are often comhined with the as-
sumption of nominal wage rigidity, as incorporated in the expectations- aug-
mented Phillips curve, in modern open economy macroeconomics. Such ex-
tended Mundell-Fleming models imply that a monetary disinflation leads
to an immediate appreciation of the exchange rate which overshoots its
equilibrium value (Dornbusch, 1973). The cumulative output loss is inde-
pendent of whether a gradualist or cold-turkey disinflation programme is
implemented, which is relevant when one studies the effects of successive
reductions in monetary growth as was done for the Medium Term Financial
Strategy of the Thatcher regime (Buiter and Miller, 1982). A fiscal expan-
sion in such models of small open economies typically has no real effects,
because the real exchange rate immediately jumps to its long-run value and
the resulting contraction in net exports exactly off-sets the increase in gov-
ernment spending- These models can be extended to allow for wealth effects
and airrent-account dynamics (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1980). In interde-
pcndent economies witó integrated financial markets and floating exchauge
rates, a monetary expansion is typically a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. The
downward pressure on interest rates and incipient capital outflows are choked
off by a depreciation of the real exchange rate which reduces net exports and
thus employment and output of the foreign country. A fiscal expansion is a
locomotive policy because the incipient capital inflows arising from the up-
ward pressure on interest rates induce an appreciation of the real exchange
rate. Turnovsky (1986), van der Plceg (1986) and Branson (1988) discuss
the own and spill-over effects oï unanticipated and anticipated changes in
monetary and fiscal policy. Two-country exchange-rate overshooting models
have been an important vehicle for studying issues of international policy
coordination (Miller and Salmon, 1985; Currie and Levine, 1985; Oudiz and
Sachs, 1985). Non-cooperative monetary disinflation occurs excessively fast,
because individual governments ignore the adverse consequences on foreign
real income and thus attempt to export inflation and disinflate too fast.
The literature discussed above addresses important and interesting pol-
icy issues, but most of it suffers from the use of ad-hoc macroeconomic
models. The objective of this paper is to reconsider these issues within the
context of two-country models with micro foundations and to conduct a
careful analysis of the main channels of international policy transmission in
more modern variants of the classic Mundell (1968) model. The advantages2
of such an approach are that the present-value budget constraints of the
governments and private sectors are modelled in a consistent manner, that
wealth effects and current-account dynamics are taken account of, that ex-
pectations are rational, that the welíare functions are directly related to the
utility of the reptesentative consumer, and that the model is less susceptible
to the Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy evaluation. The paper
ia close in spirit to the work of Rankin (1987, 1988), Svensson (1987) and
Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989), because they also stress the impor-
tance of intratemporal and intertemporal substitution in consumption for
international policy transmiasion. The main novelties of the prosent paper
are, however, that (i) the two-period analysis of previoua authors is re~placed
by a continuous-timc~ xnalyais ao t.hat a more satisfactory analysis of waqo,
exchange-rate anJ curreut-accouut dynamica ia feasible; (ii) tl~e effects uf
capital gains on initial holdings of foreign assets are analysed; (iii) depar-
tures from Ricardian debt neutrality aze analysed; and (iv) comparisons with
policy work on monetary disinflation and international interdependence are
made. In contrast to Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989), the present pa-
per is not restricted to a perfectly pooled equilibrium in which home and
foreign consumers hold identical portfolios and conaume identícal quantities
of goods.
Section 2 presents a two-country model with imperfect substitution be-
tween home and foreign goods, perfect substitution between home and for-
eign government bonds, no currency substitution, international labour im-
mobility and unemployment caused by nominal wage rigidities. Tticre is no
capital Cormation in order to stay as close as possible to the literature on
two-country, real exchange-rate overshooting models (see Giovannini, 1988;
Obstfeld, 1990; and van der Plceg, 19886 for a discussion of capital for-
mation in a full-employment setting). If households have infinite lifetimes,
Ricardian debt neutrality (Barro, 1974) holds and bond-finance and tax-
finance are equivaient. Section 3 atarts oR' with the benchmark case, which
corresponds to a unit elasticity of intertemporal aubstitution, a unit elastic-
ity of intratemporal substitution between home and foreign goods, and no
initial holdings of foreign assets. There is then no role for current-account
dynamics. The main channel of international transmission familiar (rom the
ad-hoc Mundell-Fleming modcl disappears as the nominal interest rate is
independent of fiscal policy and of changea in foreign policies. The nomi-
nal interest rate is the sum of the rate of time preference and the average
of future, expected monetary growth ratea. The large-economy multipliers
are the same as the small-economy multipliers, since the repercussions of3
home policy on the rest of the world do not affect the home economy. Home
policy dces not affect foreign employment and output. The real exchange
rate adjusts to ensure that the balance of trade is continuously in equilib-
rium. Monetary disinflation dces not induce overshooting of t}ie nominal
exchange rate. It dces lead to transient job losses, but this arises purely
from the sluggishness of nominal wages. Section 3 then goes on to analyse
three channels of international policy transmission. The first occurs when
the foreign country holds home bonds. Monetary disinflation and an in-
crease of government spending at home are associated with an appreciation
of the real exchange rate. This boosts the real value of home assets held by
foreigners and thus requires a bigger trade surplus at home in order to serve
the additional foreign debt. There are real spillover effects, because abroad
both consumption and unemployment increase. The second channel arises
when the elasticity of substitution differs from unity. When goods are gross
substitutes (complemeuts), the e.ffects of a monetary disin0ation on net for-
riKn asxets are neKativc (positivi~) and thns t.Le spill-ovrr effrcts on foreiKn
cunsuinptiou are negativo (Pusitive) in the short nin and pusitivo (ueqativo)
in the long run. 'i'he third channel occurs when the elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution exceeds (is less than) unity, because then the effects on net
foreign assets are positive (negative). This channel also allows the nominal
interest rate to be influenced by fiscal and foreign policies. Section 3 also
analyses the spill-over effects of an increase in government spending. Sec-
tion 4 relaxes Ricardian debt neutrality by allowing for finite lifetimes and
absence of operational intergenerational bequests (Blanchard, 1985). This
introduces an additional role for current-account dynamics and non-trivial
international spill-over effects of tax-financed changes in monetary growth.
Section 4 also considers debt-finance, which gives a non-trivial role for fiscal
policy as well. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 A two-country model with nominal wage rigidi-
ties and wealth effects
2.1 The model
The world consists of two economies with identical preferences and tech-
nologies. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. There is imperfect
substitution between home and foreign goods and each country is wholly4
specialised in the production of a single good. There is perfect substitution
between home and foreign government bonds. Risk-neutral arbitrage im-
plies uncovered interest parity. The asset menu consists of bonds and home
cash, so there is no currency substitution. A regime of floating exchange
rates prevails. Labour is immobile. There is an inelastic supply ot labour
and a neoclassical labour demand schedule. Wage formation follows an aug-
mented Phillips curve. The government services its debt, spends on home
goods, levies lump-sum taxea and finances the resulting deficit by printing
or borrowing money. There is períect foresight.
The representative household maximises the utility function,
U(t) - I~ exP~-P(3 - t))~u(C(~)~P~(s)) f 7u(M(9)~P~(9))~ds (2.1) a
where y~ 0, subject to the household's budget constraint,
lV - rN-}WL-7'-C-iM, (2.2)
where p denotes the subjective rate oftime preíerence, and C, M, N,T', L,W,
P~, r and í denote consumption, real money balances, non-human wealth,
taxes, employment, the real wage, the consumers' price index (CPI), the real
interest rate and the nominal interest rate, respectively. The real interest
rate equals r- i- p, where p denotes the rate of inflation in producers'
prices. Non-human wealth is the sum of bond holdings, B, money holdings,
M, and a fixed stock of capital or land, Ko - 1.
The result is the tilt of the consumption function, C~C - o(r - p)
where o- -P~u'~(Cu") denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Consumption increases over time and households save relatively more in
the early parts oí their lives if the interest rate exceeds the rate of time
preference. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
money must equal the opportunity cost of holding money, i, which yields
M-(i~y)-oC. The semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the
nominal interest rate thus equals the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Consumption consists of home goods, Cd, and foreign goods, C,,,, so that
C- Cd -~ EC,,, where E denotes the real exchange rate (price of foreign
goods in terms of home goods). Given a homothetic sub-utility function,
C~P~ - v(Cd,C,,,), one has v2w~ - E or Cd - ~(F)C,~,~' 1 0 so thatCd -(1-y)C,C,,, - yC~E and P~ - v(1-y,y~E)-' where y(E) - E~[Et
~(E)]. For a given sub-utility level, an appreciation of the real exchange rate
reduces demand for home goods and increases demand for foreign goods
(substitution e(fect). Because the CPI falls, teal income increases so the
demand for both goods increase (income effect). Whether the former or
latter effect dominates depends on whether ry"' is negative or positive or on
whether the elasticity of substitution of v(.),c -(E~'~~ ~ 0), exceeds or
is less than unity. ilence, home and foreign goods are gross substitutes
when c~ 1 and grose complements when c G 1. They are Edgeworth-
Pareto aubstitutes, Vlz ~ 0 where V(Cd,C,,,) - u[v(Cd,C,,,)], depending on
whether intratemporal substition, e, dominates or is less than intertemporal
substitution, a(Svensson, and van Wijnbergen, 1989).
Firms maximise profits under perfect competition given the production
function Y- j(L,ICo) - Lp,O C A C 1 where Y denotes output. Because
the marginal productivity of labour diminishes, both employment and ag-
gregate supply are decreasing functions oí the real producers' wage. The
other factors are fixed and also paid their marginal products, so profits arc
zero. Since the focus is on transient unernployment, effective labour sup-
ply is given by labour demand and this is what determines income, human
wealth and consumption. Nominal wage rigidity is captured by the aug-
mented Phillips curve, (YV~W) t p- olog[L~(1 - u„)] t R, a 1 0, where
u„ denotes the natural rate of unemployment. Core inflation is given by
A- B where B denotes the monetary growth rate.
The government's present-value budget constraint is
D(0) -~~ exp[- ~t r(s)ds][T(t) t B(t)M(t) - G(t)]dt, (2.3)
0 0
where D denotes real government debt issued to home and foreign house-
holds and C denotes real government spending on home goods. Solvcncy
requires that the current governrnent debt plus the discounted stream of
future levels of government spending has to be paid off by the disrounted
stream of future lump-sum taxes plus seigniorage revenues. Since Iticardian
debt neutrality prevails', one may as well assume that lump-sum taxea ad-
~An increase in bonde and non-human wealth ie exactly off-aet by a decrease in human
wealth, becauae any increase in borrowing must eventually be paid for by increasr,e in
future taxe~. Total wealth and thus conaumption are unaNected.6
just to maintain a constant stock of government debt, T- rD f G- BM.
Hence, the two exogenous policy instruments are B and G.
Equilibrium in the money market requires M~M - B- p, where the
initial price level and holdings of real money balances are unconstrained
by their past histories as they depend on expectations of future events.
Equilibrium in the home goods market requires Y- Cd ~- G~- C;,,, where
C;,, denotes exports. Net holdings of foreign assets, F - B- D are the
excess of households' holdings of bonds over government debt. Equilibrium
in the world market for government bonds requires B f EB' - D t ED' or
F~ EF' - 0. Interest payments on net foreign assets, rF, plus the balance
oftrade, C;, - EC,,, , gives the current account, which equals the increase in
the nation's wealth, F. Home ( US) agents initially do not hold any foreign
(Japanese or European) government bonds, so the initial net foreign debt,
F(0) - Fo C 0, is predetermined. An unanticipated real depreciation of the
dollar increases the relative price of US goods and wipes out the real value
of holdings of US bonds held by Japaneae and European households (F'(0)
falls). Revaluation of initial asset holdings provides an important channel
of policy transmission. When the country ia solvent, one has
-F(t) - I ~ exp[- Jar(s~)ds~[Cm(s) - E(s)Cm(9))ds, (2.4)
so the nation's cuJrrent debt has to be paid off by future trade surpluses.
Risk-neutral arbitrage ensures uncovered interest parity, r- r' t É~E,
which was already implicitly assumed in equations (2.2) and (2.3).
The complete two-country model includes toreign analogues of the rela-
tionships discussed for the home country above.
2.2 Linearisation
Log-linearisation yields ca - c t y(c - 1)e, c,,, - cd - ce, ~- o(r - p), i-
n(~ - m), ~-[p t B(~)lh, e--w~(1 - p), v --u~~l(I - A), r- r' t ~,
Y--l~'m - ficd t fxJ t f:~cm -(1 - Es)c f Fz9 f f~~~ f E~c,
Q~ - Q~( I- A) ~ ~, ~i t~s f ~~ - I, (`l.5)
m-e-P-Bfr-rl(c-rn), (2.6)7
vw-nlfx-P--o'wfBtr-0(c-m), ~~-o~(1-Q)10, (2.7)
~- ~' - o(r - P) - a(r' - P) - ae (2.8)
where small letters (except for i, r, p, x and B) denote logarithmic devia-
tions from equilibrium values (e.g., c(t) - log(C(t)~C(oo)]),~~ - Cd~Y,~z
- G~Y, ~3 - C,;,~Y and ~ - [(~1 - ~3)-y(E - I) ~ ~3(E - o)]~a. Assume a do-
mestic bias in consumption (ft ~ t;a). Equation (2.8) gives the real exchange
rate as a function ofthe ratio of home consumption to foreign consumption,
oe - a-~ c- c', where a must be chosen so that the present-value budget
constraint of the nation (2.4) is satisfied. This yields a- -(p~y)Fo~C(o)
when E- a- 1. When home consumes faster than abroad, or when home
households save relatively more in the early part of their life than foreign
households, there is a real-interest-rate differential in favour of the home
country and the terms of trade is expected to improve. The trade balance
(as a fraction of export volume) can be approximated by
bT- (CmCECm) -cm-e-cm -a-~{2[(I-7)Ef7]-1-a}e (2.9)
m
so that a debtor-coimtry (a ~ 0) runs balance-of-trade surpluses to service
its foreign debt. The (Marshall-Lerner) condition for which a depreciation
of the real exchange rate improves the trade balance is that the elasticity
of intratemporal substitution between home and foreign goods, E, exceeds
[2(1 f a)- "ry]~(1-y). Note that when E- o- I, the real exchange rate does
not affect the trade balance. In a pooling equilibrium (ry- - 2) the Marshall-
Lerner condition requires the elasticity of intratemporal substitution, E, to
exceed the elasticity ofintertemporal substitution, o, that is the goods must
be Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes. The current account gives the increase in
the wealth of the nation, f- pJ }{36T where f- F~Y.
Equations (2.6) and (2.8) yield di~dt - rl(i - op -(1 - a)r - B], so that
i(t) - aP t f~[B(3) ~(1- a)r(s)]~exp[-,~(3 - t)]Ets. (z.lo) ~The nominal interest rate equals an average of the pure rate of time pref-
erence and an average of all future expected real rates of interest plus a
weighted average of all future, expected monetary growth rates. z
2.3 Steady-state properties
In the long run the real wage, employment and output are at their natural
rates, w- C- y- 0, and inflation is given by monetary growth, p- B.
The long-run world real interest rate equals the rate oí time preference,
r- r' - p, and nominal interest rates equal i- p} B. In the long run the
inflation differential equals the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate and relative purchasing power parity holds. The steady-state levels
of consumption and the real exchange rate follow from the conditions for
equilibrium in the home and foreign goods markets:
c(~) - (-fz9 - l~hl (9 } 9.) - (f3 } f)a~ (2.11)
e(~) - Ifz(9~ - 9) t(fi - fa)a]~[o(1 - f2 -~ 2f)]. (2.12)
An increase in government spending induces an excess demand for goods,
which is choked off by an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The re-
sulting reductions in consumption and exports completely crowd out the
increase in government spending. If c- o- 1 and thus f- 0, foreign
government spending has no effect on home consumption. 1[owever, if the
elasticity of intratemporal substitution in consumption exceeda (is less than)
unity or the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than (exceeds)
~In iact, a reteree pointed out that aa exut expreeaion tor (2.10) can be obtained. It





ezp(-(l ~o)~.(B(s') t(1 - o)r(a'))ds']da}.
~unity, ~) 0 and foreign government spending depresses (increases) home
consumption. Hence, if o- 1, the spill-over effects are negative or positive
depending on whether the goods are gross substitutes or complements. In
a perfectly pooled equilibrium it depends on whether goods are Edgeworth-
Pareto substitutes (f ~ 0) or complements (~ C 0). Svensson (1987) and
Rankin (1988) also point to the importance of the degree of substitutability
in consumers' preferences for the direction of international spill-over effects
within the context of a two-period, two-country model with micro [oun-
dations. Cobb-Douglas preferences are very special, since they are on the
borderline between gross complements and gross substitutes and yield no
spill-over effects. A country with foreign debt (a ~ 0) runs trade surpluses
through an appreciation of its real exchange rate and a cut in consumption.
Hecause in the long run m- c- (p } B)~q, the effects of fiscal policy on con-
sumption are the same as on real money balances. An increase in monetary
growth Ic~ads to an equal increase in the norninal interest rate and a fall in
n~al muney balances. Seiqniorage revenues increase so taxes fall a.nd human
wealth incre.wges.
An increase in government spending reduces welfare, because it crowds
out private consumption and holdings o[ real money balances. However, if
government spending is not of the hole-in-the-ground variety, an increase in
government spending may increase welfare despite the crowding out. The
effect on foreign welfare is usually negative; if c- 1 and o C 1 or if c 1 1
and a- 1 the effect is negative. An increase in monetary growth has under
floating exchange rates no long-run international spill-over effects; it simply
reduces money balances and welfare. The full liquidity rule, B- -p, drives
the nominal interest rate to zero and ma~cimises asymptotic welfare.
2.4 T~ansient properties
The predetermined state variable is z- m-w whilst the non-predetermined
state variable is m. After some alRebraic manipulation, one obtains:
i- ar(n~ - x), x(0) - 0 (2.13)
m-~a(p f B f rlm) f orJ~(~2(1 -~s f f)9 t(1 - 1;2)(~s f f)a~f
~(m - z) t fD(Q~(o~ t on)(m~ - a') t orl~s9~ - Q~m~~ (2.14)lo
where rG - (1-f~)(o'torl) ~ 0,~ - ~o(1-f~)(1-fst2~)fA'(1-fstE))-' ~
0,0 G~~ - 0(1 - fz)(1 -~z f 2~)!2 G 1, and similarly for abroad where
a' --a. The real exchange rate and level of consumption are given by:
e-~Q~(x - x' - m f m') - fs(9 - 9~) f(~i -~s)a)~(1 - fz f- 2~)0 (2.15)
((1 - Es f f)[p'(x - m) - fz9) f F~Q'(x" - m') - fs9') -(t - fs)(E3 f E)a
c- ` (1-fs)(1-Esi-2f) ~~
(s.ls)
The model reduces to a four-dimensional state-space system with two pre-
determined state vaziables, x and x', and two non-predetermined state vari-
ables, m and m'. The assumption of perfect foresight means that the model
must satisfy the saddlepoint property (e.g., Buiter, 1984), so there must be
two eigenvalues with negative and two eigenvalues with positive real parts.
3 Channels of international policy transmission
3.1 The benchmark case
The benchmark case is when the elasticities of intertemporal and intratem-
poral substitution in consumption are unity (e - v- 1,~ - 0) and when
initial]y neither country holds any foreign assets (a - 0). The balance of
trade is then continuously in balance (6T - 0) and there is no current-
account dynamics. Additional assumptions for this result to hold are that
the government budgets of both countries are continuously in balance (cf.,
Buiter, 1989), Ricardian debt neutrality holds, and both countries havc the
same rate ot time prefcrence. The nominal interest rate equals the rate of
time preference plus a wcighted average of all future monetary growth rates,
so is unaffected by fiscal or foreign policies. An unanticipated, permanent
increase in monetary growth thus leads immediately to an equal increase in
the nominal interest rate. In ad-hoc, two-country Mundell-Fleming mod-
els familiar from textbooks (also see, for example, Turnovsky, 1986; van11
der Plceg, 1986; Branson, 1988; Miller and Salmon, 1985; Oudiz and Sachs,
1985) the main channel of international transmission is through the nominal
interest rate, but here this channel dces not exist. This is why each country
is insulated from the rest of the world and neither monetary nor fiscal policy
has any international spill-over effects on output or employment. Hence, the
impact, interim and final multipliers of economic policy are the same for a
large open economy as for a small open economy. Rankin (1987) obtains
a similar result for a two-period model with micro foundations. The real
exchange rate and therefore foreign realincome and foreign inflation can
be affected by a change in home policy. It follows that the only channel of
interdependence is through the real exchange rate, so that each country has
an incentive to export CPI-inflation by appreciating its currency 3.
There is a negative root (-cr'i;4) corresponding to the predetermined
variable z or z' and a positive root (rl) corresponding to the non-predetermi-
ned variable m or m' so the saddlepoint property is satisfied. This property
is reflected in the phase diagram (see Fig. 1). Below the 45' or i- 0 locus
the real wage is excessively low, so employment and output are above their
natural rates, the nominal wage is rising faster than monetary growth and
real liquidity, x, is falling. The rit - 0 locus is flatter than the 450 line, since
it has a slope p'~[(1 -~~)(rl~(cr' } rl)) } Q'] G 1. Below the in - 0 locus
prices are rising faster than the money supply so real money balances, m,
are falling. Along the stable arm, SS, the nomina] interest rate is constant
and thus m- c is constant, so SS satisfies
m- m(oo) -(1 - fx,-~ i~'~ [x
- z(oo)] G x- x(oo). (3.1)
llence along SS m increases more slowly than x so real wages fall along
SS. It also follows that the stablc arm, .SS, is flatter than the two loci. '1'he
phase diagram (or the foreign economy is exactly the same.
~An increase in foreign government spending inducea an increase in the relalive price
of foreign goods, which reducea home conaumption o[ foreign goode and welfare. This
externality suggesta that, in the abaence of international policy coordination, government
apending ia too high aa Lhe adveree eflecta on the other country are ignored (van der Plceg,
1988a). I[ core inflatioa gradually adjuste to CPI-inflation, there are apill-over effecte on
foreign output and employment sa well (van der Plceg, 1989).12
5.1.1 Monetary disinflation
Consider the situation where the foreign country initially has no inflation
(B" - 0) and the home country has positive inflation (B ~ 0). The rate of
depreciation oí the nominal exchange rate initially equals home monetary
growth. The home country then disinflates by bringing down its monetary
growth to zero. In thc long run its inflation rate falls to zero, its nominal
interest rate falls to U~c foreign country's interest rate, its holdinqs of real
money balances incmases to the foreign Ievi,l, and its nominal exchange rate
is stable. In fact, the nominal interest rate falls immediately on impact to its
new equilibrium value inducing agents to hold more money balances (jump
Crom E to A). The price level falls on impact, which increases the real wage
and depresses employment and output. Subsequently, the downward pres-
sure on wages arising from unemployment boosts employment and output
until they are back to their natural rates (A to E~). The fall in seigniorage
implies an increase in taxes, which together with the increase in the real in-
terest rate diminishes human wealth, consumption and aggregate demand.
Over time falling prices boost real money balances and non-human wealth
until consumption has recovered to its old equilibrium level. The temporary
rise in the real interest rate corresponds to a short-run Mundell effect.
There are no international spill-over effects apart from the ones on for-
eign consumption of home goods and foreign CPI-inflation, so each econ-
omy is insulated from the rest of the world even though there is nominal
wage rigidity and unemployment. This is in sharp contrast to the conclu-
sions derived from extended, two-country Mundell-Fleming models. During
the transient period there is a real-interest-rate differential in favour of the
home country, so the real exchange rate is expected to depreciate during
the adjustment period and must appreciate on impact. The resulting fall
in home exporte (c;,, - c' } e- c) exactly matches the fall in the value
of home imports (e ~ c,,, - c), so the trade balance is always in equilib-
rium. It follows that, as far as welfare is concerned, monetary disinflation
is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short run as foreign consumption
of home goods temporarily falla. Since on impact the real exchange rate
appreciatea, the foreign consumers' price index temporarily rises and then
falls back to its original level. There are no international spill-over effects
on output, employment and the real interest rate. Since the nominal in-
terest rate immediately jumps down and removes the differential with the
foreign nominal interest rate, the nominal exchange rate appreciates on im-
pact exactly to the new equilibrium value and is thereiore neither expected13
to depreciate, nor to appreciate during the adjustment period. Hence, the
familiar result of monetary disinflation causing overshooting of the nominal
exchange rate (Dornbusch, 1976; Buiter and Miller, 1982; Turnovsky, 1986;
van der Plceg, 1986) does not hold in this model with Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences and Ricardian debt neutrality. It is easy to show that when nominal
wages are flexible and immediately clear the labour market (a' -. oo), all
variablea jump instantaneously to their new equilibrium values.
The effecta of an anticipated monetary disinflation at home are given by
path EA~AzE'. From equation (2.11) it is clear that the nominal interest
falls on impact and continues to fall until the cut in monetary growth is
implemented. Since there are no spill-over effects on the foreign nominal
interest rate (nor for that matter on any other foreign variable, except for a
temporary increase in foreign consumers' prices and fall in foreign imports,
there is during the announcement period a nominal interest-rate-difl'erential
in favour of the home country and thus the nominal exchange rate is ex-
pected to appreciate during this period. Before the cut in monetary growth
is implemented, prices fall on impact and continue to fall afterwards. Hence,
real money balances rise over the announcement period. Since real wages
already riae during the adjustment period, the economy suffers from a re-
cession before the cut in monetary growth is even implemented.
3.1.2 Increase in government apending
An unanticipated, permanent increase in home government spending leads
to path E'BE. On impact the price level risea, which erodes the real value
of the rigid nominal wage and boosts aggregate employment and output.
The increase in government spending raises aggregate demand, but there
is some crowding out of private consumption as the erosion of real money
balances reduces non-human wealth and the ïail in real wages and increase
in taxation reduce human wealth. Subsequently, the boom raises nominal
wages faster than prices so real wages rise and employment and aggregate
supply fall back to their natural rates. Aggregate demand also falls, because
both non-human and human wealth continue to fall during the adjustment
period. The real interest rate falls on impact and subsequently recovers to
the pure rate of time preference. This is consistent with falling consumption-
Nominal interest rates are unaffected. The story is almost the same as for
a multilateral increase in government spending, because the exchange rate
insulates the home country (rom feedback of foreign repercussions.
The real exchange rate appreciates on impact and undershoots its new14
equilibrium value, because the real-interest-rate differential is in favour ofthe
foreign country and therefore the private sector expects the real exchange
rate to appreciate during the adjustment period. The nominal exchange
rate is unaffected, so the appreciation of the real exchange rate arises en-
tirely from increases in the home price level. The resulting fall in the real
value of consumption ot home goods plus foreign goods exactly equals the
fall in conaumption under a multilateral fiscal expansion. The increase in
the relative price of home gooda means that the foreign country's consump-
tion of home good falls, so foreign welfare falls. Foreign producers' prices
are unaffected, but foreign consumers' prices increase on impact and subse-
quently continue to rise to the new equilibrium level. Foreign interest rates
and the home nominal interest rate are unaffected, but there is a temporary
fall in the home real interest rate.
3.2 Revaluation of initial foreign asset holdings
Now assume that the US (home) initiaDy has a net foreign debt and holds
no Japanese (foreign) government bonda whilst Japan (abroad) holds US
government bonda, so F C 0 and is predetermined'. In that case, a previ-
ously unanticipated change in US policy affects the constant a, through an
initial jump in C(0), and thus the real exchange rate. From (2.16) one has
a- á(1 - c(~)J - ( a ) JArm(~) f~29(0)J f á
1 -~2 -~3a
and the perfect-foresight solution of (2.13)-(2.19) yields
(3.2)
m(o) --(E3Es~~)a - I~ exP(-nt)IE~B(t) t EaEz9(t)Jdt (3.3)
0
where á- -(P~fa)IFóIY(fi-)~ ~ 0 and ~s - r)I(1 -~2 f ~3r). Note that a is
not affected by Japaneae policy, so US policy afiects Japaneae real outcomes
but (given that c- o- 1) not vice versa. If one restricts attention to
permanent changes in policy, one can solve (3.2)-(3.3):
~It ia usumed that Aonde are resl. I( they are nominal, lhen there are aleo revaluation
eHecta due to jumpe in the price level.15
-Q'f4e f ~~(n - A'~5) q9
bT - a- a t ri(1 - Sz -~3a) t?:3SSI~~Q)
á. (3.4)
There is still no current-account dynamics, as the trade surplus generates
just sufficient revenues to service US foreign debt, nominal interest rates are
unaffected by fiscal policy, and the nominal exchange rate jumps immedi-
ately to its new equilibrium level.
Monetary disinflation in the US requires an increase in net exports to
Japan (provided ~3á is not too large), because the associated real apprecia-
tion of the dollar boosts the real value of Japanese holdings of US assets. The
additional interest income from the US permits Japan to run a trade deficit.
This manifests itself through a fall in Japanese supply and an increase in
Japanese consumption, whereas in the US the adverse effects of disinflation
on unemployment are attenuated. The additional demand in Japan derives
from a fall in the price level, which boosts the real value of the wage and
depresses employment and output. Over time nominal wages fall in Japan
until equilibrium in the labour market is restored. Hence, when allowance
is made for capital gains on foreign holdings of home assets, a disinflation
at home causes transitory unemployment abroad.
An increase in US government spending leaves the nominal exchange
rate unaffected, but induces a real appreciation of the dollar and an increase
in the real value of US assets held by Japan. Japan can afford a trade
deficit, since it receives additional interest income from the US (as q-
Q'~s - rll;a 1 0). The fall in the Japanese price level induces a fall in
supply, causing transient unemployment, and an increase in the consumption
level of Japan. The temporary boom in the US is less than when the US
did not have any foreign debt. Hence, if c- a- 1, an increase in US
government spending is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy when the US has
a foreign debt but a locomotive policy when the US holds foreign assets.
This channel of international transmission occurs through capital gains on
Japanese holdings of US assets. Similar effects have previously been analysed
within the context of ad-hoc Keynesian, two-country models with imperfect
substitution between home and foreign assets (Allen and Kenen, 1980).1 fi
3.8 Grosa aubstitutea and groas complementa
Now assume that initially neither country holds foreign assets and that the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity (a - O,o - 1). Equation
(2.10) shows that the nominal interest rate remains unaffected by fiscal or
foreign policies and is entirely determined by the rate of time preference plus
a weighted average of future monetazy growth rates. A permanent reduction
in monetary growth then immediately leads to an equal fall in the nominal
interest rate and an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate to its new
equilibrium level. Equation (2.9) shows that the temporary appreciation of
the real exchange rate induces short-run trade deficits and accumulation of
foreign debt when goods are gross substitutes (e ~ 1,~ 1 0) and short-run
trade surpluses and accumulation of foreign assets when goods are gross
complements. In the long run there must, of course, be a trade surplus to
service the accumulated foreign debt when goods are gross substitutes, but a
trade deficit when goods are gross complements. The effects on consumption
and thus on real money balances are negative in the short run and positive
in the long run when goods are gross substitutes, but positive in the short
run and negative in the long run when goods are gross complements. If in
the short run real money balances fall, then prices increase, real wages fall
and employment increases. Hence, the short-run spill-over effects on foreign
employment and employment are in the opposite. direction of those on foreign
consumption. When goods are gross substitutes, foreign prices increase over
time and thus there is a temporary fall in foreign real interest rates. If goods
are gross complements, there is a temporary increase in foreign real interest
rate. These reaults are confirmed by the numerical simulations presented
in Table 1(using the package of Markink and van der Plceg, 1989). The
real exchange rate misadjusts when goods aze gross substitutes, because a
long-run trade surplus must be associated with a depreciation of the real
exchange rate. When goods are gross complements, the real exchange rate
overshoots its long-run value.
An increase in government spending leaves nominal interest rates unaf-
fected. The nominal exchange rate immediately jumps to its new long-run
value. When goods are gross substitutes (e - 2), it leads to short-run trade
surpluses, build-up of foreign assets and a long-run trade deficit, so foreign
consumption and real money balances first increase and then fall whilst for-
eign unemployment temporazily increases. The real and nominal exchange
rates depreciate on impact. Table 2 shows that all these effects are reversed
when goods are gross complements (t - 0.5).17
3.4 Role of intertemporal substitution
Now assume that initially neither country holds foreign assets and that the
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between home and foreign goods is
unity (a - O,e - 1). Equation (2.10) s}iows that a high elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution causes overshooting of the nominal interest rate
and consequently undershooting oí the nominal exchange rate, because the
temporary increase in real interest ratea reinforces the fall in the current
nominal interest rate when o~ 1. Equation (2.9) shows that the appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate which occurs on impact must be asso-
ciated with short-run trade surpluses and accumulation of foreign assets
when o 1 1. In the long run the interest income derived from foreign assets
permits a trade deficít. It follows that foreign consumption increases in the
short run, but must decrease in the long run, and that the real exchange
rate overshoots its long-run value. The fall in foreign prices causes tran-
sient unemployment abroad. A low elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(o C 1) gives rise to undershooting of the nominal interest rate, overshoot-
ing of the nominal exchauge rate, misadjustment of the real exchange rate,
and accumulation of foreign debt asaociated with ahort-run trade deficits
and a long-run trade surplus. The spill-over effects for abroad are transient
over-employment, falls in st~ort-run consumption, and an increase in long-
run consumption. In general, there are two effects of disinRation. The first
is an appreciation of the currency, which induces agents to substitute away
from home goods so foreign output increases (intratemporal substitution).
The second is a fall in inflation and increase in real interest rates, so agents
substitute in favour of future goods and current output falls (intertemporal
substitution). Such saving shows up in current-account surpluses. When
intertemporal substitution dominates intratemporal substitution, disinfla-
tion causes transient unemployment abroad which contradicts conventional
Mundell-Fleming results. The precise condition for this to happen in a per-
fectly pooled equilibrium is that o exceeds e, or that home and foreign goods
are Edgeworth-Pareto complements (Svensson and van Wijnbergen, 1989).
Table 1 confirms the above discussion with numerical simulations.
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution exceeds unity, an in-
crease in government spending leads to a build-up of foreign debt, a long-run
trade surplus, a small fall in toreign consumption in the short run and an
increase in the long run, some transient over-employment abroad. When the
degrec of intertemporal substitution is less, these effects are reversed. Tablc
2 illustrates the rolc of intertemporal substitution.18
4 Departures from Ricardian debt neutrality
4.1 Finite livea and current-account dynamics
So far, the current account played a trivial role because the model satisfied
debt neutrality and consequently government debt and net foreign assets
did not affect conaumption and aggregate demand. Here departures from
debt neutrality are considered, which can arise when one assumes capital
market imperfections, distortionary taxes, or lack of an intergenerational
bequest motive combined with a positive birth rate arising through finite
livea (Blanchard, 1985) or population growth (Weil, 1989). The extension
that follows adopta the asaumption of finite lives. It inttoduces a channel
o( international tranamiasion, which arises even when r- a- 1 and n- 0.
F,ach eeonomy consists o( identical consumers with conatant life axpectancy,
1~6, and no intergenerational boqucst motivo. Consurners maximise ex-
pected utilily, which means that they maximise utility ueing Lhe discount
rate p f 6 instead of p where 6~ 0 denotes the inatantaueous probability of
death. The individual consumer receives (pays) at every period of his life a
premium at the rate 6 and at the time of death the individual's net wealth
(debt) gces to (is cancelled by) the life insurance companies. This premium
is actuarially fair, so the life insurance market is efficient. At each instant s
a cohort of size 6 is born, whose size at instant f~ s equals 6exp[-á(s - t)],
so the population at instant t equals fc~ 6 exp[-d(s - t)]ds - 1. Population
aggregates are obtained as the sum of the products of the consumption of
each surviving cohort with its size. This yields the aggregate consumption
function C(t) -(p ~ á)[N(t) .} H(t)], where human wealth is given by
H(t) - I ~ exp[- J~(r(9) ~ á)ds'][W(s)L(s) - T(s)]ds. (4.1)
Human wealth is the discounted stream of after-tax wage income, where the
discount rate ia augmented with the probability of death in order to allow for
the fact that individuala only earn income when they are alive. The return
on aggregate non-human wealth dces not contain a life insurance premiurn,
because this constitutes a transfer from those who die to those who survive.
Substitution into (2.2) gives C -[r - p]C - 6(Á f p)N. Now government
bonds, and in particular net foreign assets, affect aggregate consumption
bchaviour. 'Che assurnption of finite lives drivea a wedge between the dis-
count rate to calcula.te human wc.alth, r} á, and the one used to calculate19
non-human wealth, r. This wedge allowa the burden of higher taxation to
be passed on to future, yet unborn generations, so that Ricardian debt neu-
trality no longer holds. Linearisation yields when e- v- l,a - 0: (2.6),
(2.13),
Q'(x - m) - fic f f29 f~3(c' t e) (4.2)
f- Pf t f3(c' } e- c), J(0) - 0 (4.3)
c- r- P- Á(6 f P)~(yln)(m - c) f(1 -~2)-t(Í f d)1, (4.4)
where p' - r(oo) and d e DIY denotes the government debt-GDP ratio.
The variables f, x and x', are predetermined, whilst m, rra', c, c' and e are
non-predetermined.
As before, the long-run levels of the real wage, output and employment
are at their natural rates and long-run inflation is given by monetary growth.
Steady-state equilibrium in asset markets yields:
f(~) - 2(1- f~)(7In')(B - e') f 2(d' - d) (4.5)
r(oo) -[p - 2ë'(B -~ B') t ë"(d } d')ll(1-f ê') (4.6)
~(~)-[ptet?h'(e-B')frs"(dfd')ll(ltri') (n.~)
where 6' - b(ê -~ p)7I~h and 6" - q(1 -~s)-~ó(6 } p). Steady-state equilib-
rium in the goode markets and curreut account yields:
e(~) - r~z(9' - 9) t~P~ ~ f~ ~ Id - d' f(1 - E2) (~~ (B' - B) 1
4.8
I` 1 - ~s ~ ( )20
cd(~) - c(~) - ~-fz9 - zP'~d - d~ f (1 - fs) ~~) (B' - B)J1
1- f~ ll
cm(~) -
r-~79~ - gP~(FI~f'3)(d- d' f (1 - tt9) (,~jl) (B~ - B))
` 1 - fs ~ . (4.10)
An increase in home monetary growth increases the long-run opportunity
cost of holding real money balances, i(oo), and reduces the long-run real
interest rate. This is the Mundell effect. As a result private sector agents
switch out of money into bonds, so that long-run holdings of net foreign
assets increase. This is associated with a trade deficit, because the interest
receipts on net foreign assets allow home individuals to consume more and
foreigners to consume less. The reduction in net exports is accompanied
by an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The increase in seigniorage
revenues permits a cut in taxation, which combined with the fall in the
real interest rate raises long-run home human wealth. This, combined with
the increase in bond holdings, ensures that total wealth and consumption
at home increase in the long run. A global increase in monetary growth
leaves net foreign assets, exchange rates, consumption, exports and imports
unaffected in the long run. It simply leads to a fall in the world real interest
rate, an increase in nominal interest rates and a fall in real money balances.
A tax-financed increase in home government spending leads to no long-
run changes in net foreign assets or interest rates. It leads to an increase in
the home price level and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which
induce a fall in home consumption and exports. There is complete crowding
out. Since taxes vary to keep government debt constant, the steady-state
and transient effects are exactly as discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.1.2.
The cumulative output gain follows from equation (2.13):
(4.9)
~~Y(t)dt - A~fW~T(t) - m{t))dl - -(ij~n) f~ x(t)dt - - (~) m(oo)
(A r rfs9 -F zP'Id- d' ~- {1 - fs) ~~~ (B' - B)]1
`~ ~ 1 I` 1- Ez fl
!B t z6'(B - B' ) -F. 6"{d f d" )1 1
1` n(lfó) J1
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A monetary disinflation reduces the cumulative deviation of foreign output
from its natural level, less so under finite lives. A monetazy expansion is
thus a locomotive policy. In contrast to short-run Mundell-Fleming analyais,
an increase in government spending doea not affect the foreign cumulative
output ]oss. The effects of a tax-financed increase in government spending on
the home cumulative output loss again do not depend on whether expected
lifetimes are finite or infinite. The cumulative output loas dces not depend
on whether a gradualist or "cold-turkeyn policy is adopted. The cumulative
output loss increaaes when labour markete are lesa flexible (low a) and when
the share of government is lazge.
Table 1 presents the efFects of a rnonetary dieinflation when there ie a
life expectancy of 50. In contrast to the case of infinite livea, the nomi-
nal exchange rate appreciates and overshoots its new equilibrium value by
12.5q. The explanation is, however, very different from the one offered
by two-country extensions of Dornbusch's (1976) model. The initial trade
deficits lead to accumulation of foreign debt, so that in the long run the
real exchange rate has to depreciate in order to generate a trade surplus
sufficiently large to finance the interest on the accumulated foreign debt.
Hence, on impact the real exchange rate misadjusts. The long-run build-
up of foreign debt causes a fall in home consumption and a corresponding
increase in foreign consumption. This is in sharp contrast with the case of
infinite lives, where disinflation dces not affect long-run levels of consump-
tion and foreign debt. In addition, under finite lives the home price level
has to fall about l0010 less and the foreign price level has to increase a bit
in the long run. In contrast to the case of infinite lives, there is a lasting
Mundell effect, since the nominal intereat rate falls 13q less than the rate
ofinflation. At home the cumulative output loss or sacrifice ratio is 59.410!' 0,
whereas abroad the cumulative output gain is 0.59q. This reflects the fact
that a disinflation causes tranaient employment gaina abroad, whereas with
infinite lives foreign employment is unaffected.
4.2 Bond-finance
So far, taxes adjusted to have a zero public aector borrowing requirement. It
may be more reasonable to assume that the government deficit is financed by
borrowing. In order to ensure solvency of the government's finances, taxes
are increased when the government debt increases, T- To - vD, v~ r22
where To denotes autonomous taxes and v denotes the reaction ccefficient.
It follows from (2.3) that
á - (v' - v)~t t f~(.v - y) - (1 - f~ )(7l r~)B, ~(~) - ~~. (a.12)
~xpressione (4.5)-(4.11) hold with d(oo) - ~s;.29 - (1 - f~) (Y) 9)~(v - P').
A smaller reaction ccefficient (v) leads to a larger government debt which
ceterys parióua pushes up interest rates throughout the world and leads to
an increase in foreign debt in the long run. The direct effect is an increase
in long- run non-human wealth at home and abroad. Human wealth is cut
at home as taxes are increased when government debt is increased. This
outweighs the increase in non-human wealth, since home consumption and
imports must fall in the long run in order to generate a trade surplus to fi-
nance the extra interest payments on foreign debt. Foreign consumption of
home and of foreign goods increase by the same amount as home consump-
tion falls. The result ofthis excess demand for foreign goods is a depreciation
of the long-run real exchange rate (see (4.5)-(4.10)).
Instead of examining the effects of a change in long-run government
debt, given fiscal and monetary policy, it may be more natural to exam-
ine the eftectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy when government debt is
endogeneous. These results will be difterent from the long-run multipliers
discussed in Section 4.1, as can be witnessed from Tables 1 and 2, because
the assumption of finite lives means that taxes can be passed on to future,
yet unborn generations. A bond-financed cut in monetary growth leads to
less seigniorage revenues and thus to an accumulation of government debt
which eventually leads to more conventional taxes. This is why consumption
falls on impact, but it falls by less than with a tax-financed cut as people
discount future taxes by more tor they may possibly not be around to pay
them. Consequently, the home price level and the levels of employment and
oulput fall by smaller amounts than with a tax-financed cut in monetary
growth. Less crowding out of private consumption in the short run implies
that the initial trade deficits are larger and consequently in the long run
there is a higher foreign debt and a greater loss in the nation's wealth than
with tax finance. More interest payments on foreign debt must be financed
through a larger trade surplus in the long run. This is why the long-run
depreciation of the real exchange rate and the corresponding long-run fall in
home consumption and increase in foreign consumption are one-and-a-half23
times as much as with tax finance. The nominal exchange rate still over-
shoots. It appreciates by muchless in the long run, because there is a smaller
(greater) fall (increase) in the long-run home (foreign) price level. The real
exchange rate misadjusts by a gteater amount. Because the increased stock
of government bonds must be willingly held, there is a larger rise in the long-
run world real interest rate than with tax finance. The home cumulative
output loss is smaller, whilst the foreign cumulative output gain is higher
than with tax finance. The short-run Mundell-Fleming analysis is confirmed,
because monetary diainflation boosts foreign employment and output and
consequently a monetary expansion must be a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
A bond-financed increase in government apending almost completely
eradicates crowding out of private consumption, because households now
know that new generations will be around to service the taxes required to
service and redeem the accumulated government debt. The home price level
and consequently home output rises by more than with tax finance, whilst
in contrast to with tax finance the foreign price level and foreign output
rise in the short run. Combined with the initial appreciation of the real
exchange rate, transient ttade deficits and a build-up of toreign debt occur.
In the long run there must be a trade surplus to generate the revenues that
are required to service the foreign debt. This is why in the long run the real
exchange rate appreciates by less and home conaumption falls by more than
with tax finance, whilst in contrast to with tax finance foreign consumption
increases. The long-run home price level rises by much more now, which is
the main reason why the long-run nominal exchange rate depreciates. Table
2 also confirms that the cumulative output gain at home is much higher than
with tax finance and that now there is small cumulative output gain abroad.
This result confirms the locomotive property of a bond-financed increase in
government spending, familiar from traditional Mundell-Fleming analysis.
5 Concluding remarks
A two-country, intertemporal, perfect-foresight model with micro founda-
tions, floating exchange rates, uncovered interest parity, and nominal-wage
sluggishness has been formulated. The ptesent-value budget constraints of
governments and private agents have been modelled in an internally con-
sistent manner. When the elasticity of iatertemporal substitution and the
elasticity of intratemporal subatitution between home and foreign goods are
unity, when initially neither country holds foreign assets, and when Rícar-24
dian debt neutrality holds, there are no international spill-over effects so that
the multipliers for monetary growth and government spending are the same
for a small open economy as for a large open economy. In addition the real
exchange rate adjusts to maintain continuous equilibrium in the trade bal-
ance, so there ie no role foc curtent- account dynamics, the nominal interest
rate is unaffected by fiscal or monetary policies, and the nominal exchange
rate immediately jumps to its new equilibrium level. These somewhat sur-
prising results follow from both government budgets being continuously in
balance and from both countries having the same rate of time preference.
When one departs from this benchmark case, one can identify five chan-
nels of international policy transmission. The first occurs when foreigners
holds home bonds, because then the appreciation of the real exchange rate
associated with a monetary disinflation and a fiscal expansion boosts the
real valuc of homc assets hcld by foreigncrs. A bigger trade surplus is ro-
quired to generate the revenues necessary to service the higher foreign debt,
hence home consumption falls and foreign consumption increases. The cap-
ital gains on home assets held by foreigners also leads to transitory unem-
ployment abroad. The second channel is opened up when goods are gross
substitutes or gross complements. In the former case monetary disinflation
causes accumulation of foreign debt, a long-run trade surplus, higher foreign
employment and lower foreign consumption in the short run, higher foreign
long-run consumption, temporary falls in the foreign real interest rate, and
misadjustment of the real exchange rate. In the latter case one has accumu-
lation of foreign assets, transitory unemployment abroad and overshooting
of the nominal exchange rate. An increase in government spending leads
to accumulation of foreign assets when goods are gross substitutes and to
foreign debt when goods are gross complements.
The third channel allows the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to
be different from unity and the nominal interest rate to be influenced by fis-
cal and foreign policies. When this elasticity is greater than one, disinflation
means that there is an accumulation of foreign assets, foreign consumption
increases and then falls, foreign unemployment increases temporarily, and
the nominal interest rate overshoots, but if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is less than one, these effects are the other way round. An
increase in government spending leads for elasticities of intertemporal sub-
stitution higher than one to a build-up offoreign debt, but tor elasticities less
than one to a build-up of foreign assets. For a perfectly pooled equilibriu~n it
is essential to determine whether the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
exceeds or is less than the elasticity of intratemporal substitution, because25
this determines whether a monetary disinflation or an increase in government
spending }eads to a build-up of foreign debt or assets. A monetazy disin-
flation leads to two effects. The first is an appreciation of the currency, so
agents aubstitute away from home gooda and toreign output increases. The
second is that home inflation falls, so the real interest rate rises and agents
substitute in favour of future goods so current output falls. The saving of
the nation shows up in current-account surpluses. Hence, if intertemporal
substitution dominatea intratemporal substitution, or in a perfectly pooled
equilibrium if home and foreign goods aze Edgeworth-Pareto complements,
disinflation causes transient unemployment abroad which contradicts the
familiar Mundell-Fleming results. A potential fourth channel of interna-
tional transmission occurs when core inflation catches up with CPI-inflation
in a gradual fashion, because then changes in the real exchange rate affect
consumers' prices, wage and thus employment and output abroad (van der
Plceg, 1989).
To give a non-trivial role to wealth effects and current-account dynamica
and to allow for a fifth channel of international spill-over effects, the bench-
mark model was extended to allow for finite lifetimes so that Ricardian debt
neutrality no longer holds. Tax-financed monetary disinflation leads to a
build-up of foreign debt, misadjuatment of the real exchange rate and the
trade balance, overshooting of the nominal exchange rate and a build-up
of toreign debt. For a comparison between tax-financed and debt-financed
changes in monetary growth and government apending it is essential to allow
for the present-value budget constraints of private agents and governments
and the implied dynamics in the current account. Debt finance leads to
less crowding out of ptivate consumption in the short run, but to a bigger
build-up offoreign debt and consequently more crowding out of private con-
sumption in the long run. The cumulative output loss at home is smaller
whilst the cumulative output gain abroad arising from a bond-financed dis-
inflation is higher than with tax finance.
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